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1  Introduction 
 
Our decision to write on access to patented pharmaceutical medicines was 
motivated by the need for persons to acknowledge and recognise the public-health 
rights of healthcare and access to medicine, though often neglected, as fundamental 
human rights.1 Every national jurisdiction has some form of legal imperative to 
enable or make it possible for its citizens to enjoy certain fundamental human rights 
and civil liberties and freedoms. South Africa, for example, has an obligation to 
ensure the progressive realisation of all human rights that are not immediately 
realisable such as, for example, the right of access to healthcare. This obligation 
arises from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the 
Constitution) and international law.2 The Constitution states that everyone has the 
right to have "access to health care services" 3 and that "the state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures within available resources to achieve the 
progressive realisation of these rights".4 One reads or hears mention on a daily basis 
of the prevalence of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome5 (AIDS) in Sub-Saharan Africa6 (SSA) and the 
                                                 

  Omphemetse S Sibanda B Juris LLB (Vista) LLM (Georgetown) LLD (NWU). Professor and Chair 
of Department of Criminal and Procedural Law, College of Law, UNISA,SIBANOS@unisa.ac.za. 
1  For very illuminating studies on HIV/AIDS and human rights, see generally Gumedze 2004 AJHR 
181-200;  Kirby 2004 AJHR 163-180. See also Singh, Govender and Reddy 2005 Georgetown 
Journal on Poverty Law & Policy 355-388. 
2  See generally Chirwa 2003 SAJHR 541-566. 
3  Section 27(1)(a) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
4  Section 27(2) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
5  Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) occurs when a Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
(HIV) positive  person suffers from lowered immune levels making him/her a target of a different 
opportunistic infection. The full names were given in the abstract. 
6  Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a geographical term used to describe the area of the African 
continent which lies south of the Sahara (a desert land) or those African countries that are fully or 
partially located south of the Sahara. The SSA countries are Angola; Benin; Botswana; Burkina 
Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo 
(Brazzaville); Congo DRC (Zaire); Cote d'Ivoire; Djibouti; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Ethiopia; 
Gabon; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; 
Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; Niger; Nigeria; Reunion; Rwanda; Sao Tome 
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challenges of access to patented pharmaceutical medicines. As access to essential 
medicine is one of the basic pillars of social welfare and human development, urgent 
attention is required for this dire situation. This serves as the inspiration for this 
article. 
 
In the landmark judgments of the South African Constitutional Court in Grootboom7  
and Treatment Action Campaign,8 the court unequivocally affirmed the principle that 
measures should be taken by the state for the delivery of socio-economic rights. In a 
matter that related to housing, the court in Grootboom obliged the State to provide 
an enabling environment for the provision of housing by identifying the relevant 
"legal, administrative operational and financial hurdles and lowering them over 
time".9 In the context of access to antiretrovirals (ARVs) and related treatment, the 
decision calls for the consideration of all possible ways through which the 
progressive realisation of this right may be accomplished, including (i) recourse to 
access initiatives, be they regional or international, (ii) the provision of additional 
funds, and (iii) the reduction of the cost of medicines through various legislative and 
regulatory measures.10 In the context of this study, access initiatives are considered 
in this article by appraising how and to what extent the Canadian and European 
access to medicines regimes – discussed in Part 2 – which are based on the 
flexibilities introduced in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement called the 
Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property11 (TRIPS) – 
discussed in Part 3 – can be used to address the HIV/AIDS challenges in SSA and 
other developing countries. Arguments against TRIPS-flexibilities are discussed in 
Part 4.   
 
The United Nations has declared HIV/AIDS in SSA as "a threat against humanity", 
and that the situation requires "interventions of emergency proportions" and of 
"urgent and exceptional national, regional and international action".12 The South 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Principe; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Somalia; South Africa; Sudan; Swaziland; 
Tanzania; Togo; Zambia; and Zimbabwe. 
7   Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
8  Minister of Health v TAC (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
9      Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 45. 
10  See generally Hassim, Heywood, and Berger Health Law and Policy.. 
11    TRIPS Agreement (1994). 
12   See UN 2001 www.who.int.  
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African Constitutional Court in Minister of Health v TAC (No 2)13  highlighted the HIV 
and AIDS situation by making reference to the HIV/AIDS & STD Strategic Plan for 
South Africa 2000-2005, which described the HIV and AIDS pandemic in South 
Africa as "an incomprehensible calamity" and "the most important challenge facing 
South Africa since the birth of our new democracy".14 The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, for example, has declared HIV/AIDS in Africa a serious 
threat against humanity, which needs urgent and exceptional intervention 
measures.15 This challenge was acknowledged by African states in the Maputo 
Declaration on Malaria, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious 
Diseases,16 which consequently committed themselves to taking appropriate steps to 
curb the HIV/AIDS pandemic, including putting in place measures to scale up the 
treatment for HIV/AIDS.17 This is a welcome commitment by African countries in the 
light of Article 16(2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) 
of 1981, which requires State Parties to "take the necessary measures to protect the 
health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they 
are sick". 
 
Many people have died from HIV and AIDS in developing countries - about 30 million 
plus to date. In some SSA countries AIDS has wiped out entire communities and 
families.18 Part of the burden of HIV and AIDS prevalence in SSA is the high number 
                                                 
13   Minister of Health v TAC (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
14   Minister of Health v TAC (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 1.  
15  The declaration of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) contained in 
a compendium by Heyns and Killander Key Human Rights Documents 279.  
16   See AU 2003 www.iss.co.za. Alongside the HIV/AIDS pandemic, malaria is one of the most 
devastating diseases in Africa. The disease is transmitted when a person is bitten by a mosquito 
carrying the parasite that causes the disease. According to the Malaria Research Programme of 
the Medical Council of South Africa, malaria is a killer disease in SSA, with a greater prevalence 
than cases of TB, AIDS, measles and leprosy combined. It is therefore the leading cause of 
morbidity and mortality in SSA. The Malaria Research Programme (MRP), formerly National 
Malaria Research, was established in 1992 as a lead programme of the South African Medical 
Research Council (MRC) focusing on malaria-vector research, insecticide evaluations, research 
on the malaria parasite, and drug resistance in malaria. See Keiser et al 2004 American Journal 
of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 118-127. Another challenge with HIV also lies in its ability to 
change its profile with deceptive flexibility to cause death and disability through pneumonia, skin 
cancer, tuberculosis, and other opportunistic diseases. For countries like South Africa, which 
struggle with the spread of tuberculosis, this makes the situation even worse.  
17   See Heyns and Killander Key Human Rights Documents 279. 
18   Schoofs illustrates the debilitating effect of HIV and AIDS through the life of Arthur Chinaka, who 
in 1990 was 19 years old and in high school. His father died of AIDS and other opportunistic 
diseases. In 1992, his uncle Edward died of AIDS. In 1994, his uncle Richard died of AIDS. 
Another uncle, Alex, died of AIDS in 1996. In the same year his aunt Eunice and a fourth uncle 
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of orphans among the survivors, and the stigma that people continue to place on 
HIV- and AIDS-infected individuals and their affected families.19 Stigmatised people 
continue to be discriminated against and treated with prejudice as social outcasts, 
overtly or covertly. Some of the people so stigmatised even face unfair labour 
practices, including dismissal from work under the pretext of occupational disability20 
and automatic dismissals due to their refusal to disclose their HIV status.21 A study 
published by UNESCO's International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) 
reveals the high numbers of orphans among the survivors as one of the 
consequences of the impact of HIV and AIDS on children in developing countries, 
and that SSA has a huge number of orphaned children of less than 10 years of 
age.22 These children are expected to head their households from as young as 
seven years of age. The country-specific HIV and AIDS outlook is equally 
unsatisfactory. In South Africa, for example, it was estimated in 2010 that the "overall 
HIV prevalence rate is approximately 10,5%, and that the total number of people 
living with HIV is estimated at approximately 5,24 million".23  People living in poor 
rural and urban informal settlement areas are at highest risk of HIV infection. These 
people are mainly the have-nots and find it difficult to access HIV and AIDS 
treatment and medicines without government help. 
 
2 TRIPS, protection of intellectual property, and public health  
 
The WTO governs matters relating to the protection of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) primarily through TRIPS. Part of the preventative rights afforded to patent 
holders by TRIPS is that the production, distribution and other forms of exploitation 
of their pharmaceutical products must be done within the context of the rules  under 
TRIPS. Thus, TRIPS gives the producers of pharmaceutical products recourse to 
protect their profits by allowing them to register patents over their products. A 
                                                                                                                                                        
also died of aids. Almost his entire family was wiped out by HIV and AIDS. See Schoofs 1999 
www.village.   
19   See Tsoose 2010 PELJ  423-428. 
20   See, for example, Hoffmann v South African Airways 2000 ZACC 17, and Bootes v Eagle Inc 
System KZ Natal (Pty) Ltd 2008 29 ILJ 139. For more on dismissals based on HIV and AIDS 
status, see generally the SALC 2011 www.unaids.org.cn 
21   See, for example, Allpass v Mooikloof Estates (Pty) Ltd t/a Mooikloof Equestrain Centre 2011 
ZALC 2. 
22   UNESCO-IIEP 2002 www.unesco.org.iiep.  
23   Statistics South Africa 2010 www.statssa.gov.za 3-5.  
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negative effect of this patent protection in the context of healthcare rights has been 
the restriction in the access to and flow of patented medicines.   
 
WTO members have been aware of the restriction on access to pharmaceutical 
products as a result of the application of TRIPS provisions. Consequently, a few 
important decisions in relation to TRIPS have been adopted to address the 
challenges of access to medicines necessary to deal with the public-health problems 
facing many developing countries. Notable among these decisions are: Decision on 
Paragraph 17 of the Main Doha Declaration of 14 November 2001 (Doha Decision 
on Paragraph 17 of TRIPS); the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health of 14 November 200424 (Doha Declaration on TRIPS of 2001); the Decision 
on the Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
for LDC Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products 
of 27 June 2002 (Decision on TRIPS Extension for LDCs); the Decision on LDC 
Members' Obligations under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with Respect to 
Pharmaceutical Products of 8 July 2002 (Decision on LDC Members' Obligations 
under Article 70.9 of TRIPS); the Decision on the Implementation  of Paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 30 August 2003 
(TRIPS Decision of 2003); the Decision on the Amendment of TRIPS Agreement of 6 
December 200525 (TRIPS Amendment); the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health (the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS); and the 
Decision of 17 December 2009 to extend the deadline for accepting TRIPS 
Agreement Amendments.  
 
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS was adopted by the WTO Ministerial Council at its 
conference held from 9 to 14 November 2001 in Doha, Qatar, to introduce flexibilities 
into TRIPS as identified in the Doha Decision on Paragraph 17 of TRIPS. Most 
importantly, it required that TRIPS must be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
that is supportive of public health. The Decision on TRIPS Extension for Least-
Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Decision on LDC Members' Obligations under 
                                                 
24  Doha Declaration on TRIPS (2001).  
25  TRIPS Amendment (2005). The amendments to TRIPS Agreement were to be made by 1 
December 2007 or after at least two-thirds of the members had accepted them, or by any such 
later date as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference. The 1 December 2007 deadline 
failed and was extended to December 2009. This has been further extended to 31 December 
2011.     
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Article 70.9 of TRIPS created a special dispensation for least-developed countries. In 
terms of the former, LDCs did not have to protect pharmaceutical patents and test 
data until 1 January 2010. Moreover, LDCs had the right to seek further extensions 
to this period. The latter Decision allows LDCs not to give exclusive rights to 
pharmaceuticals that are subject to patent application until 1 January 2016.  
 
The TRIPS Decision of 2003 gives effect to the Doha Declaration on TRIPS by 
removing limitations on exports under compulsory licence to countries that cannot 
manufacture the pharmaceutical themselves. WTO Member states need to build 
flexibilities into TRIPS or to amend TRIPS to allow countries to address adequately 
their public health problems and situations of national emergency or extreme 
urgency.26 The importance of the TRIPS Decision of 2003 was reaffirmed by the 
WTO during the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS. In brief, the TRIPS 
Decision of 2003 primarily attempts to loosen the restrictive nature of the protection 
of IPRs in the TRIPS Agreement, and thus the effect it has on access to patented 
pharmaceutical products. Article 31 of TRIPS permits the unauthorised exploitation 
of intellectual property rights (IPRs) by WTO members. Pursuant to Article 31(f), the 
unauthorised production of patented pharmaceutical medicines may be justifiable in 
cases of national emergencies and other circumstances of extreme urgency, subject 
to the license or exploitation of the IPRs being "predominantly for supply of the 
domestic market of the authorizing Member". Article 31(f) is restrictive in that it 
allows compulsory licensing predominantly for domestic production for the supply of 
a country authorising such use only. The restriction becomes more severe when 
applied to a country with insufficient or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, 
which would mean that such members lacking the capacity or infrastructure to 
manufacture pharmaceuticals have to rely on imported pharmaceuticals. In brief, 
Article 31 on its own is inflexible.27 
 
According to paragraph 2 of the TRIPS Decision of 2003, the WTO members may 
manufacture pharmaceutical products under compulsory licence and export them to 
eligible WTO member(s), which include all least-developed countries and any 
member who notifies the TRIPS Council of his/her intention to use the system under 
                                                 
26  See generally Sibanda 2009 Acta Academica 187.    
27   See generally Sibanda 2009 Acta Academica 191-192. 
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the TRIPS Decision of 2003. The TRIPS Decision of 2003 further permits the re-
exportation of imported pharmaceutical products by developing or least-developed 
members to other developing and least-developed countries. 
 
The TRIPS Decision of 2003 is a temporary measure, which is to be replaced by 
permanently amending the relevant provision of TRIPS through the insertion of 
Article 31bis after Article 31 of TRIPS, and also by inserting the Annex to the TRIPS 
after Article 73. It is hoped that the TRIPS Amendment will effect permanent 
changes to the TRIPS Agreement.28  Article 31bis(1) expressly precludes recourse to 
Article 31(f) in order to deny the grant of compulsory licences by members "to the 
extent necessary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and 
its export to an eligible importing Member(s)". Article 31bis(3) reiterates the 
importance of members developing and improving the necessary pharmaceutical 
production capacity, and interregional assistance in cases where such capacity is 
lacking. Therefore, a pharmaceutical product produced or imported under a 
compulsory licence by one member may be exported legitimately to the markets of 
those other developing or least developed country parties to the regional trade 
agreement "that share the health problem in question".   
 
3 The legislative framework for compulsory licensing systems under the 
Canadian and EU access regimes  
 
3.1  General  
 
In keeping with the flexibilities introduced to TRIPS in May 2004, Canada passed the 
Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act - The Jean Chrétien 
Pledge to Africa.29 The Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa, which will from here onwards 
                                                 
28   Article 31bis is not markedly different from the TRIPS Decision of 2003. It is more of an 
adaptation of the TRIPS Decision of 2003 and the regulatory essence of the two is the same. 
Several identical aspects exist between the TRIPS Decision of 2003 and the TRIPS Amendment. 
For example, like the TRIPS Decision of 2003, a 31bis lists detailed conditions which must be 
complied with before using TRIPS flexibilities. Notable among these is the adequate 
remuneration of the patent right holder pursuant to a 31bis(2). Most importantly, a 31bis(4) 
provides that any measures taken in fulfilment and conformity with the conditions of a 3 “shall not 
be challenged”.  
29   Act to amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act - The Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa, 
S.C. 2004, c. 23. 
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be broadly referred to as the Canada Access to Medicine Regime (CAMR), is a 
pledge by the government of Canada to assist specifically African countries in 
alleviating their problem of access to medicine essential in the fight against health 
pandemics besetting them. The EU implemented the TRIPS Decision of 2003 
through Regulation (EC) No 816/200630 of the European Parliament (EP) and the 
European Council (EC) of May 2006. In the words of someone who has been 
affected greatly by HIV/AIDS, Jack Kay, Apotex President and its Chief Operations 
Officer, recourse to such flexibilities is "… the right thing to do for the people dying 
from AIDS in Africa".31 The Canadian and European flexibility regimes respectively 
have as their objectives making pharmaceutical products more accessible. The 
CAMR was the first of such legislation pursuant to the TRIPS Decision of 2003, and 
was later followed by the EU Regulation, whose essential elements are drawn 




The CAMR has been described as a historical and ground-breaking "crucial piece of 
legislation"33 from the perspective of the WTO discipline on access to essential 
medicine. Canada is the first country in the world to enact legislation implementing 
the TRIPS Decision of 2003. It was unanimously passed into law in May 2004 and 
came into effect on 14 May 2005 together with its accompanying regulations, which 
were later published on 1 June 2005 as Part II of the Canada Gazette to deal with 
the compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical 
products for export to eligible countries.34 This enactment meant that Canada 
became the first member of the WTO to enact the law that amended its Patent Act of 
198535 in order to implement the TRIPS flexibilities. This was true to the country's 
September 2003 announcement of its intention to implement the TRIPS Decision of 
2003 into national law.  
                                                 
30  EU 2006 www.cptech.org. See also Cornides 2007 JWIP 70.    
31   Quote taken Apotex 2008 www.apotex.com.  
32   EU 2006 www.cptech.org. 
33   Per Mr J Leprince, president of Aventis Pharma (Canada), giving evidence before the Standing 
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, 37th Parl. 3d sess., No. 004 (26 February 
2004). 
34    Eligible in terms of para 1.03(1)(b) of the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985.  
35   Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985.  
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The CAMR resulted from extensive consultation with pharmaceutical industry 
stakeholders, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and parliamentarians. 
Interestingly, it was also a subject of review in 2007. The review was necessitated by 
the fact that the new access to the medicine system has never been used since its 
inception, apparently because of the flaws in the JCPA, which make it unworkable.36  
 
3.1.2 European Union 
 
The EU Regulation, which entered into force on 29 June 2006, has been praised as 
an indication that the EU has "lived up to the engagement it has made at the Doha 
Ministerial Conference".37 The Regulation now enables the manufacture of patented 
pharmaceutical products under licence by someone other than the patent holder for 
export to countries with public-health problems. The Regulation underwent serious 
and intensive informal scrutiny by the EC and the EP, with the particular intention of 
shaping its text to properly balance public and private interests. The commission's 
proposal  of 29 October 2004 was highly instrumental in shaping the nature of the 
EU Regulation. One should note the EC's approach, possibly a very important 
approach from the perspective of the WTO, of not deviating materially from the 
TRIPS Decision of 2003. In this regard, the Commission proposed that no further 
conditions  or restrictions should be imposed, except the conditions for the 
application and grant of compulsory licences akin to those found in voluntary 
licensing agreements.38 Another feature of the EU system is that it has been agreed 
that member states should decide on the administrative and formal requirements 
necessary for the "efficient processing of the [compulsory licensing] application" 
under the EU Regulation.39 The Regulation discourages litigation related to IPRs and 
their use by countries to "pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives".40 
 
  
                                                 
36   Human Rights Working Group 2007 www.camr-rcam.gc.ca 3. 
37    Cornides 2007 JWIP 74. 
38    See generally EU 2006 www.cptech.org.  
39    Cornides 2007 JWIP 73. 
40   Clause 6 of the preamble to the Regulation (EU 2006 www.cptech.org.). 
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3.2   Comparative appraisal of selected provisions of the EU and Canadian 
measures in comparison with the WTO provisions    
 
3.2.1     Eligible importers and beneficiary countries 
 
3.2.1.1    The WTO Provision   
 
The WTO regulatory framework and associated agreements apply to the WTO 
members. As noted earlier, paragraph 2 of the TRIPS Decision of 2003 and Article 
31bis of the TRIPS Amendment, for example, allowed the WTO members to 
manufacture pharmaceutical products under compulsory license and export them to 
eligible WTO member(s) only, and for WTO members of developing and least-
developed states to re-export such imported pharmaceutical products to other 
developing and least-developed WTO member countries with whom they are party to 
a regional trade agreement. In effect, non-WTO members, particularly poor and 
least-developed countries, often with non-existent and/or poor levels of development 
of pharmaceutical industry capacity, are left out of the beneficiary fold.  
 
3.2.1.2 The CAMR 
 
Pursuant to paragraph 21.03(1)(b) of the Patent Act, some 50 least-developed 
countries have been listed as eligible importers of essential medicines from Canada 
under the TRIPS flexibility system, including some non-WTO members. In this 
regard Canada exceeded all expectations by setting the precedent of allowing both 
WTO members and non-WTO members to import pharmaceutical products under a 
compulsory licence. This apparently moral and humanitarian approach in the 
Canadian legislation should be commended and applauded for its indiscriminate 
accommodation of the health needs of least-developed and low-income countries. 
However, the CAMR sets a differential standard and rules for members and non-
members using the procedure. While WTO member countries need merely to make 
an application based on a state of emergency, non-member countries need to prove 
the existence of their state of emergency. Therefore countries which are in serious 
need of pharmaceutical medicines for HIV and AIDS but are not WTO members may 
find it challenging to access these medicines under the CAMR.    
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It is instructive to recall that issues relating to access to medicine received 
prominence in the WTO after concerns were expressed that the rules of the TRIPS 
Agreement have the effect of excluding a large number of poor people and 
developing countries from access to affordable medicine. This situation was 
compounded by a skewness in the manufacture, pricing and distribution of patented 
pharmaceutical products,41 the lack or insufficiency of domestic pharmaceutical 
research and manufacturing  capacity, and the lack of an appropriate legal 
framework.42 In this context, the inclusion of non-WTO member countries as eligible 
importers under the Canadian compulsory licensing scheme should be applauded. 
 
In terms of 21.04(2)(f) of the Patent Act, NGOs and other entities may import 
pharmaceutical products, provided they get the permission of an eligible importing 
country.  This requirement for having the permission of an eligible importing country 
has been viewed by NGOs, including the Access to Medicines Movement,43 as 
rather unnecessary and burdensome from the perspective of public health. They 
believe that it limits the role played and that can be played by NGOs and other 
similar groups in the procurement of essential medicines.44 However, we are of the 
opinion that the requirement should be allowed to stand. The importing countries 
have the responsibility of public-health issues in their territories, and must therefore 
be allowed the final say in the distribution of medicines within their borders. It is hard 
to imagine a situation whereby any organisation freely and without any notification to 
a particular sovereign country distributes and dispenses medicines within the 
territory of such a country,  with complete disregard  for the public health system of 
the country.   
 
3.2.1.3 EU Resolution 
 
The European Commission had initially proposed to follow the WTO and limit the 
beneficiary countries to WTO members. The move was mooted, however, as 
                                                 
41  Bluestone 2001 Tropical Medicine and International Health 162; Froneman 2000 
www.panos.org.ukss;  Ngwena 2002 SAPL 24-25. 
42  Masungu, Villanueva and Blasetti 2004 www.ipsonline.org.resource.docs. 
43  Access to Medicines Movement is an informal coalition of civil society organisations such as 
Medicins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders), Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), Health 
GAP, Oxfam, and Knowledge Ecology International. 
44  See generally Bubela and Morin 2010 dev.ulb.ac.be. 
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"undesirable" and it was decided that the Resolution should be extended to "all least 
developed and low-income countries, including those who are not members of the 
WTO".45 This compromise was a welcome humanitarian decision which made 
essential medicine more accessible globally. In terms of Article 4 of the EU 
Regulation, the beneficiary countries include least-developed countries as 
designated by the United Nations. As far as NGOs' involvement in the importation is 
concerned, the Netherlands is one of the few countries in the EU that allows NGOs 
to import pharmaceutical products without  requiring permission from  the 
government of the importing country.46 It is left to the  importing country to determine 
issues of permision for importing such products. It is submitted that the importing 
country will in most cases insist on the requisition of such permission as part of its 
responsibility to ensure that imported medical products are safe for use in its 
territory.  
 
3.2.2   EIigible pharmaceutical products 
 
3.2.2.1    The CAMR 
 
In what many have described as the constriction of the pharmaceutical products 
needs of the importing countries, the CAMR introduced a Schedule 1 for products 
possible to import under the compulsory system of the CAMR. Schedule 1 is 
modelled on the WHO Model List for Essential Medicines,47 which serves as a guide 
for the development of national and institutional essential medicine lists. The TRIPS 
Decision of 2003 on which the CAMR is based does not require such listing of 
eligible pharmaceutical products.  
 
Several valid criticisms of this provision have been expressed. The list is accused of 
being excessively narrow.48 To start with, the Schedule 1 list contains only 57 drugs 
or vaccines, dominated by antiretroviral medicines. Only three drugs are for 
tuberculosis, malaria and trypanosomiasis. Others like enalapril, etopiside, morphine 
                                                 
45  Cornides 2007 JWIP 72. 
46   Ng and Kohler 2008 Health Law Journal 154. 
47   WHO 2007 whqlibdoc.who.int. 
48   Cohen-Kohler, Esmail and Cosio 2007 www.globalizationandhealth.com.  
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and timol are already off-patent.49 This skewed list overlooks the fact that the TRIPS 
flexibilities are designed to ensure access for even non-communicable diseases that 
pose public health problems. This misapprehension is due to the fact that the TRIPS 
Decision of 2003 was designed for only HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis. 
Reference to HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis in the Doha Decision is only of 
illustrative significance.   
 
Medicines and treatment for other pandemics not expressly mentioned in the Doha 
Decision may be made available through other measures in compliance with TRIPS 
flexibilities. Unfortunately, the misinterpretation of the Doha Decision has seen 
efforts by the pharmaceutical sector to resist efforts of countries like Thailand to use 
TRIPS flexibilities for diseases such as acute heart disease, which efforts are viewed 
as a violation of WTO rules.50 With respect to off-patent drugs, it seems a vain 
exercise to implement a special medicine regime for such a patent since they are 
available for public use anyway, or can be sourced from countries like India, which 
has been providing much-needed ARV drugs to SSA.51 Of course there are safety 
implications in regard to these off-patent drugs which should  not be lightly 
dismissed, and any efforts made to ensure their safety and fitness for purpose are 
welcome.52 
 
3.2.3  Remuneration 
 
3.2.3.1    The WTO Provision 
 
The TRIPS flexibilities do not do away with the need to compensate IPR holders. 
Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement requires the WTO members to put in place a 
system that will ensure that the patent right-holder or owner is adequately 
remunerated. Yet both the TRIPS and the TRIPS Decision of 2003 do not provide a 
                                                 
49  For the patent status of many drugs see the United States Federal Drug Administration Date 
Unknown www.fda.gov.   
50  See generally Savoie 2007 Va Int’l L 211. 
51  Bhattacharya 2008 Va J Int’l L 396, 398. 
52  The United States legislation, Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002, Public Law (P.L.) 
107-109, reauthorizes the pediatric studies provision of the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization and Accountability Act of 1997 to improve the safety and efficacy of off-patent 
drugs that are used in children.  
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formula for the determination of adequate remuneration. Under ordinary 
circumstances remuneration would be determined based on the standard of 
reasonableness applying in the importing country, or any other functionally 
equivalent standard, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the economic 
value derived from compulsory licensing.53 
 
3.2.3.2   The CAMR Provision 
 
Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement has been echoed in the CAMR. IPR holders 
are entitled to remuneration upon the licensing of their patents. However, no formula 
for the calculation of the remuneration is provided. 
 
3.2.3.3   The EU Provision  
 
Unlike the TRIPS and the CAMR,  the EU Regulation provides for a formula to 
calculate adequate remuneration. In terms of Article 10(9)(a) of the Regulation, 
remuneration is limited to 4% of the price paid by the importing country when 
pharmaceutical products concerned are used in situations of national health 
emergencies without prior negotiation. Article 10(9)(b) permits a different approach in 
situations that cannot be described as constituting national emergencies. In this 
regard the 4% remuneration ceiling may be applied, but the authority granting the 
compulsory  licence  may  base the amount of renumeration payable on any other 
considerations, including the economic value of the intended use under license to 
the importing country, and the humanitarian or non-commercial circumstances 
relating to the intended use. 
 
3.2.4  Safety, quality, and efficacy standards review  
 
3.2.4.1   The CAMR  
 
In addition to meeting the requirements of the Food and Drugs Act, the CAMR 
requires that the generic pharmaceutical products destined for export also receive 
                                                 
53   See generally Ng and Kohler 2008 Health Law Journal 160-161. 
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the approval of Health Canada regarding their safety, quality and efficacy standards. 
Prima facie, the Health Canada review looks like an unnecessary bureaucratic 
hurdle which has the potential to cause delay in accessing pharmaceutical products, 
particularly in respect of countries that require the WHO's pre-qualification of 
imported pharmaceutical products.54 
   
However, the review process in the CAMR is a policy consideration which, when 
examined closely, carries benefits for importing countries. The dominant perspective 
on this requirement should be that of the demand for individually safe medicines. 
With some studies revealing a high degree of serious adverse reactions to the use of 
such medicines, even resulting in deaths in countries like the United States, every 
necessary safety measure is welcome irrespective of the origin of the medicine.55 
Therefore, with product liability class cases possible in countries like South Africa,56 
pharmaceutical companies may want to rethink the call to discard safety 
requirements in such circumstances.      
 
3.2.4.2 EU Regulation 
 
Like the CAMR, the EU Regulation makes reference to safety and efficacy in medical 
products. In terms of Article 18(1)(a) and (b) of the Regulation, licensees can avail 
themselves of the scientific opinion procedure under Article 58 of Regulation (EC) 
726/2004,57 or any similar procedure prescribed under national law such as scientific 
opinions or export certificates for medicines intended exclusively for markets outside 
the Union.58  
 
  
                                                 
54  See Human Rights Working Group 2007 www.camr-rcam.gc.ca 6. 
55   A 1998 study by Sasjack 2008 AJLM 10 reports that there are about two million adverse 
medicine reaction hospitalisations and a million deaths in  the United States annually. 
56  Under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA). The CPA was signed by the President of 
the Republic of South Africa on 24 April 2009 and published in the Government Gazette on 29 
April 2009. The Act came into force on 1 April 2011. 
57  EU 2004 ec.europa.eu. 
58  See Cornides 2007 JWIP 74. 
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3.2.5  Anti-diversion of products  
 
3.2.5.1  The WTO Provision 
 
The anti-diversion provisions as set out in paragraph 2(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Decision 
of 2003 require the information on the quantity of pharmaceutical products shipped 
to each destination, and the distinguished features of the products to be posted on 
the licensee's website. 
 
3.2.5.2   The CAMR 
 
Canada has added to the stated WTO anti-diversion provision by requiring 
"information identifying every known party that will be handling the products while in 
transit from Canada".59 According to Medicins Sans Frontiers, this additional 
requirement is one that "increase[s] the complexity of the process" of obtaining the 
compulsory licence in addition to the "overly cumbersome" TRIPS Decision of 
2003.60 
 
4  The unjustified rhetoric of the rejection of TRIPS flexibilities 
 
Interestingly, there has been little enthusiasm by countries to take advantage of the 
TRIPS flexibilities. In South Africa, for example, although the courts have not been 
hesitant in making rulings that ensure a significant degree of realisation of the right of 
access to health care for HIV/AIDS patients,61 there has been no movement by the 
State towards taking advantage of the WTO-inspired flexibilities. It would seem that 
this reluctance to take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities is a common feature in many 
regions. For example, out of many of the east and southern African countries (ESA 
countries) that battle with HIV/AIDS challenges, only Zambia had accepted the 
Protocol Amending TRIPS at the time of writing this research.62 Many of the ESA 
                                                 
59  Act to amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act, s 21.06. 
60  Medicins Sans Frontiers 2006 www.msf.ca 6. 
61  For example, Minister of Health v TAC (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) and EN v Government of South 
Africa 2007 1 All SA 74 (D). In  EN v Government of South Africa  the Durban High Court ordered 
the government in the Westville Prisoners case 16 forthwith to provide ARV treatment to affected 
prisoners.  (Also refer to the more commonly known TAC case). 
62   WTO 2011 wto.org. 
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countries' laws, including those of South Africa, do not explicitly include TRIPS 
flexibilities. This is very unfortunate given the fact that South Africa has the capacity 
to assist the region with cheaper drug exports because of its relatively advanced 
pharmaceutical regulatory setup and infrastructure.  
 
There have been about three requests for compulsory license under the CAMR, 
including the 13 February 2006 request from Biolyse Pharma Corporation for patents 
on oseltamivir phosphate, which is sold by Roche under the brand name Tamiflu.63 
At the time of writing this paper only Rwanda has benefited from the Canadian 
access regime by importing HIV drugs through a Canadian company called Apotex,64 
following its successful application to the Canadian authorities for the manufacture 
and export of a fixed combination for the treatment of AIDS. 
 
The Canadian and the EU measures have come under attack from public health 
access movement and advocacy groups for allegedly falling short of making 
pharmaceutical products more accessible. Critics like Oxfam, which is part of the 
Access to Medicines Movement, argue that the fact that no compulsory licence has 
been granted since the Doha Decision was adopted in 2003 until recently when 
Canada  exported mecidines to Rwanda shows that the flexibility system is a 
"complete failure".65    
 
These criticisims are very interesting, because they hardly address alternative 
access regimes, and fall short of considering the role played by other factors in the 
failure of the compulsory licensing system for pharmaceutical products, such as the 
patents' monopoly. The criticism tends to be oblivious to the opportunities presented 
by these measures to assist in the alleviation of the disease burden in countries in 
SSA. Some of the arguments are not entirely valid and lack substance. They fail to 
acknowledge the important incentives and benefits that can be reaped by taking 
                                                 
63  Love 2007 keionline.org. 
64   See generally Hestermeyer 2007 www.asil.org. Hestermeyer reports that on 17 July 2007, 
Rwanda notified the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that it plans to import the HIV-drug TriAvir from Apotex, and 
that on 4 October 2007 Canada notified the Council for TRIPS of the compulsory license. The 
drugs were exported to Rwanda in May 2008.   
65  See Cornides 2007 JWIP 70. 
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advantage of these flexibilities from the perspective of access to health as a human 
right instead of the purely commercial perspective.  
 
Let us consider the following: TRIPS sets out minimum standards for the protection 
of all WTO members, including a substantial increase in terms of patent protection 
with product patent replacing process patent in all fields including pharmaceutical 
products.66 The fundamental purpose and the value of the patent protection system 
cannot be underestimated. The patent protection system provides the IPR holder 
with a monopoly on the invention, expecting that the value to broader society would 
be the encouragement of innovation.67 However, the system has some undesirable 
consequences. There are several challenges to accessing patented and off-patent 
medicines, some of which are attributable to the primarily profit-driven conduct of the 
pharmaceutical sector. Firstly, the high prices charged by IPR holders and related 
competitive behaviours impede access to essential medicine.68 This has led to 
jurisdictions like the EC undertaking an enquiry into the practices of the 
pharmaceutical sector.69  It is noteworthy in the context of this paper that the EC 
Report found that IPR holders contribute to the delay in the production, 
dissemination and access to generic medicines through using a "variety of 
instruments to extend the life of their medicines".70 The strategies include dilatory 
patent-filling strategies;71 patent-related exchanges and litigation;72 and patent 
settlement in which the marketing capacity of the generic sector is restricted.73  
 
In 2003, for example, the South African Competition Commission found that 
GlaxoSmithKline South Africa (Pty) Ltd (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI)'s were 
involved in anti-competitive conduct that impacted on the accessibility of HIV/AIDS-
related medicine. According to the Commission the firms maintained highly abusive 
                                                 
66  It is interesting that the practice of product patent was once prohibited in several jurisdictions. In 
Germany, product patent was explicitly excluded under the law of 25 May 1877 and was later 
introduced in 4 September 1967. The Constitution of Switzerland explicitly prohibited product 
patents for pharmaceuticals until 1977. Spain introduced product patents in 1986 after accession 
to the European Economic Community (EEC). See Li 2008 www.wider.unu.edu 1. 
67   CIPR 2002 www.iprcommission.org 1.  
68   Saggi 2007 www.iprsonline.org 5. 
69    European Commission 2009 ec.europa.eu.  
70    European Commission 2009 ec.europa.eu para 3.2. 
71    European Commission 2009 ec.europa.eu para 3.2.1. 
72    European Commission 2009 ec.europa.eu para 3.2.2. 
73    European Commission 2009 ec.europa.eu para 3.2.4. 
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and restrictive practices in the antiretroviral market, which is prohibited by the 
Competition Act 89 of 1998, and had refused to grant patent licences to generic 
manufacturers.74 Moreover, the Commission found that their HIV/Aids drugs "are not 
affordable" to many South African living with HIV.75 The undesirable behaviour of 
pharmaceutical companies was evident in 1999 when the pharmaceutical sector 
opposed the implementation of the Medicines and Related Substances Control 
Amendment Act (MRSCAA) 90 of 1997. One of the aims of the  MRSCAA was to 
enable the Minister of Health to introduce measures "so as to protect the health of 
the public", and to make pharmaceuticals more affordable.76 The issue ended up in 
the Pretoria High Court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association and Others v 
the President of the Republic of South Africa,77 in which the constitutionallity of 
certain provisions of MRSCAA were challenged as denying intellectual property 
owners the protection required by TRIPS Agreement. It was also claimed that by 
implementing MRSCAA, South Africa would be in breach of its obligations under 
TRIPS, in particular Articles 28 and 27.78 Unfortunately the case was withdrawn, and 
the court could not decide on the matter. The other related barrier to access to 
essential medicines is the TRIPS-Plus trade arrangements.  
 
A TRIPS-Plus provision is a trade agreement that is normally insisted upon by the 
United States and the European Union under the guise of protecting IPR holders.  
TRIPS-Plus provisions require a level of intellectual property protection in domestic 
laws that go beyond the minimum standards required by the TRIPS Agreement.79 
The benefits of TRIPS-Plus arrangements to least-developed and developing 
countries are mostly at the expense of their public health needs. 80    
 
SSA countries and NGOs must take advantage of the regulatory flexibilities of 
Canada and the European Union to provide their communities with essential 
medicines and treatment for HIV and AIDS.  
                                                 
74    Competition Commission 2004 www.compcom.co.za 1. 
75 Competition Commission 2004 www.compcom.co.za 2. 
76 See Sibanda 2009 Acta Academica 193.  
77 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association and v the President of the Republic of South Africa 
Case no 4183/98. 
78    See generally Collins 2001 Syracuse J Int'l L 158-183. 
79    See Lindstrom 2010 International Law and Politics 919. 
80  See, for example, El-Said 2007 JWIP 454, arguing that TRIPS-Plus benefits are often 
exaggerated and not supported with empirical evidence as in the case of their benefit to Jordan. 
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5     Conclusion      
 
The CAMR and EU Resolutions have the potential to usher in an era that has great 
impact and could make a significant contribution to granting access to 
pharmaceutical products for developing and least-developed countries. Needless to 
say, the CAMR and the EU Regulations and similar TRIPS-compliant measures 
have come under attack as falling short of making pharmaceutical products more 
accessible. Chief amongst the criticism are the bureaucratic requirements and 
stringent provisions in the measures, which have been blamed for the lack of interest 
by beneficiary countries in taking advantage of the regime to date. Critics like Oxfam, 
which is part of the Access movement, argue that the fact that no compulsory licence 
had until recently been granted since the Doha Decision was adopted in 2003 shows 
that the flexibility system is a "complete failure".81 The criticism may be correct in 
part. Unfortunately, as shown in Part 4, much of the criticism amounts to nothing 
more than unjustified rhetoric rejecting the inherent benefits of TRIPS-inspired 
flexibilities, and is myopically slanted towards protecting the commercial gains of 
pharmaceutical businesses. The critics fail to consider the role played by other 
factors, as discussed in section 3.2 above, in the failure of the compulsory licensing 
system, which may include political tug-of-wars and the behaviour of both the patent 
originators and the generic competitors. Furthermore, it is wrong to measure the 
success of the new Canadian and European compulsory licensing systems, or of 
similar initiatives, by the number of licences granted. It is still too early to use 
numbers as a yardstick. 
 
The health needs of people in developing and least-developed countries cannot 
afford to wait for an unkown solution while the world is caught up in an academic 
debate over the effectiveness of the compulsory licensing system. Every effort 
should be made to make use of measures such as the Canadian and European 
                                                 
81  See Cornides 2007 JWIP 70.  Rwanda became the first country on 17 July 2007 to notify the 
WTO’s Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  of its intention to import 
HIV-drug TriAvir from the Canadian pharmaceutical company Apotex. In September 2007 the 
Canadian authorities issued a compulsory license to enable Apotex to use nine patented 
inventions to manufacture and export  TriAvir to Rwanda. This issuing of compulsory license 
under the CAMR was later notified to Council for TRIPS on 4 November 2007. For more on this 
Rwandan case see generally, Amollo 2007 AJICL. 
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systems to bring essential medicines to where they are much needed in SSA. 
Possible measures may include, for instance, an HIV and AIDS policy change or the 
enactment of legislation that specifically deals with access to HIV and AIDS 
treatment and medicines within the framework of TRIPS-flexibilities.      
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